Editorial by Kuhn, Harold B.
Social Ethics and its Orthodoxy
The acceleration of interest in the science
of society which marked the second half
of the nineteenth century would scarcely
fail to have its repercussions in theological
education. In addition to a growing social
interest in the conventional theological
disciplines, there appeared new departments
and professorships in Social Ethics. Today
Social Ethics has a firm place among the
disciplines for the training of the minister.
It is, therefore, of great concern to the
Church that the studies undertaken in this
division shall be of such a nature as to
contribute positively to the preparation of
the candidate.
In connection with the development of
this branch of theological training, it is
interesting to note that it has already de
veloped an orthodoxy of its own. This
is the more remarkable in the light of two
facts: first, the relative newness of the
discipline of Social Ethics; and second,
the precarious state of contemporary social
and economic conditions. A canvass of the
writings of the outstanding professors of
Social Ethics reveals that the new division
of socio-theological studies is fairly char
acterized as of the political and social left.
To be orthodox in this field demands that
the writer or instructor be opposed to the
present capitalistic order particularly as it
exists in the United States.
This editorial proposes to examine sever
al of the premises which the current Social
Ethics discipline assumes, with a view to
detemining whether or not they are as
sound as their proponents think them to be.
Some of them seem, on the surface at least,
to be highly debatable, and possibly open
to the charge of being naive.
Basic to the orthodoxy of modern Social
Ethics is the view that our present econom
ic system is inescapably geared to an un
workable nationalism, which is in turn the
cause of wars. At the same time, our
brethren of the left inveigh against cartel
agreements which are obviously interna
tional in character, and which frequently
produce such anomalous results in wars
between states. It is assumed, further, that
national rivalries are purely economic
things. Those who thus declare seem to
this writer to oversimplify the problem.
While economic considerations are fre
quently to blame in large part for wars, it
is hardly safe to neglect the other factors
involved, such as love of location, patriotic
sensitiveness, cultural inferiority complexes,
and the like. In any case, history hardly
clears those nations in which the political
order overshadows the economic order of
guilt for precipitating wars.
The second assumption which seems to
demand attention is, that those nations
which have adopted strong governmental
controls over economic processes have done
so purely as a result of the rational con
clusions of their enlightened citizens that
a more free economy is wrong . Now, there
are some nations, such as the Scandanavian
countries, which have made voluntary
moves in the direction of state socialism.
None will deny, however, that these peo
ples, numerically and geographically small
and surrounded by powerful states whose
economies they fear, have been influenced
by certain practical considerations which
would hardly have issued from a simple
belief in the fundamental unsoundness of
capitalism.
More significant still is the blunt fact
that several nations now experimenting
with state socialism, notably Great Britain,
are doing so because their physical re
sources have been depleted beyond the
degree from which recovery was possible
from private enterprise. In other words,
only the State is now an instrument
sufficiently powerful to undertake the
gigantic problem of reconstruction. One
gets the feeling that these states have
adopted Socialism as a compromise meas-
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ure, to secure them, if possible, against
total chaos and the Communism which in
evitably breeds in economic ferment. Few
indeed are the instances of major powers
which have moved from free enterprise to
state control over the economic system un
der any other circumstances except those
of disaster.
A third assumption is, that these nations
which are now moving toward the left have
at long last embarked upon a course which
will end the absurd and destructive fluctu
ations to which the capitalist economy is
subject. It is true that the Soviet Union
has put an end to some economic problems :
the machinery for this purpose operated
recently in the shuffle of currency there.
One is tempted to wonder how many pro
fessors of Social Ethics would wish to have
the endowments upon which their salaries
depend subject to such currency manipu
lations as occurred this past fall in the
Soviet Union. And to declare at this stage
any degree of success for Great Britain in
this respect requires either vast predictive
power or a blind faith in a given type of
economic arrangement. Possibly Britain
will in time, with the aid of capital fur
nished under the Marshall Plan, restore
some semblance of economic stability.
We are asked, however, to believe that
the United States is decades behind the
times in continuing with her relatively free
economy, while the other parts of the world
move boldly ahead toward rational societies
in which depressions remain only in the
memories of the aged. It is true, of course,
that our economic system has its evil
spots; certainly no one of understanding
would pretend that is it as efficient as it
might be. At the same time, common sense
demands some reserve in the expression of
optimism with respect to the success of
newer movements.
A fourth presupposition which seems de
batable is, that the strong state need not
be an arbitrary state. We are assured that
fear of the strong state grows out of a
basic mistrust of human nature�a lack of
confidence in the essential goodness of
man. Against this, we are bidden to believe
that totalitarianism is but an accidental per
version of statecraft, due to (temporary)
power distortions growing out of the loss
of individuality in a previous capitalistic
society.' In other words, the strong state
is bad only as a result of a hold-over from
the capitalistic order. If this be true, it
follows as a matter of course that history
can teach us nothing about the ultimate
destiny of the strong state.
Social theologians of the orthodox school
insist that we are setting up a false anti
thesis when we set free-enterprise against
collectivism. They bid us cease to empha
size the element of power in the corporate
life, and to place additional confidence in
the essential altruism in human nature
which underlies the social tendencies in
mankind. An appeal to history is far from
reassuring at this point: few indeed have
been the statesmen who were not corrupted
by power to the abuse of power. The grim
record of the past bears witness to the per-
sistance of the egoistic impulse, and of the
tendency of strength to beget lust for
power. Moreover, the strong and efficient
state demands long tenure of office for
its leadership. It is far from reassuring
to study the effects of perpetuity in office
upon state officials. Seldom have strong
states administered by 'career' men exerted
power in the direction of the freedom of
the common man.
It is a commonplace to say that coercion
plays a large part in human corporate life.
The genius of democracy is, that its co
ercions are dispersed : in addition to legal
coercion there are hidden coercions from
non-state sources. A case might conceivably
be made for the view that the best safe
guard against state tyranny is to be found
in a system of dispersed coercions, with
their inevitable checks upon each other.
It goes without saying that there is no
simple either . . . or between a completely
free economy and an economy administered
by the strong state. The United States of
America possesses government 'services',
such as the Post Office, the I. C. C, etc.
' Walter G. Muelder, "Concerning Power in the
State" in The Philosophical Forum, Vol. V.
Spring, 1947, p. 3.
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Moreover, it has made an experiment in
state-industry in T. V. A. Possibly some
enterprises are too large for private capital
and must be undertaken, if at all, by gov
ernmental agencies. To date, however,
these have been kept in check by parallel
business structures, privately owned.
A fifth assumption to which attention
needs to be drawn is that state capitalism
will avoid the abuses to which private capi
talism is subject. It goes without saying
that economic liberals have, in general,
seen that the structure of our world de
mands vast pools of economic power�that
no spindle-and-loom economy can be ex
pected to survive. This is a tacit admission
that it is not capitalism which is wrong,
but capitalism in non-public hands. One is
tempted to inquire what alchemy will render
this instrument evil on one hand and good
on the other. The ideal answer would
speak of the state as acting in the 'public
good' and of private capitalism as acting
solely in the interest of the few. This
rests again upon the assumption that the
strong state is more ethical than a private
economy balanced by a state which acts as
an umpire rather than a board of directors.
It seems to the writer that the whole
case of the political left depends upon the
emergence, under conditions of the strong
state, of administrators of such idealism
and altruism as will cause them to subor
dinate private to public interest. Some will
doubtless inquire concerning the probability
of the production of such a type of altru
ism, and concerning what magic in the
planned economy will bring forth such a
rare product. The modern social anthro
pologist may reply, that a right view of
the state as a moral reality will clarify the
problem, and that there is need for a deeper
realization of the teleological working of
the social real in its members�when they
are freed from the inhibiting distortions
which have hitherto worked through the
economy of private capital.
A sixth assumption is expressed in terms
of the bearing of the science of nuclear
fission upon statecraft. Inasmuch as the
discovery of methods for the release of
atomic energy opens a source of power
too great to be entrusted to private hands,
it must be in the trusteeship of the state.
This is by no means a frivolous argument.
While it is too early to assess the overall
significance of atomic power for the civili
zation of the decades to come, it seems
within the range of the possible that gov
ernments will perforce be engaged in the
business of exploiting and allocating atomic
energy�provided they can handle their
differences with other governments through
diplomatic channels. At the same time, we
are well advised to avoid the customary
hysteria with respect to this subject, and to
remember that other factors may operate
to alter the entire picture before peacetime
exploitation of atomic fission is feasible.
A seventh assumption is that public
ownership of key industries is compatible
with private ownership of a significant
number of others. Those who assert this
take for granted that the state will be con
tent to be just so strong and no stronger,
and that it will need to regulate only certain
categories of business�say natural re
sources, or public utilities. There is some
thing to be said, however, for the view that
competitive factors will compel nothing less
than all-out socialism. Private business
can hardly compete with public business,
so long as deficits in the latter can be cared
for out of the public treasury. The writer
is aware of the complicated nature of the
problem of economic risks, and their rela
tion to profit margin.^ Doubtless this factor
has been greatly overworked as a justifi
cation of profit as a factor in the economy
of a people. At the same time, it seems
inescapable that state capitalism must swal
low more and more of the economy of the
people in whose name it works.
The eighth and last assumption to which
attention is turned is that private capitalism
represents a severance of economics from
Christian morality, and that state capitalism
will reunite the two. This argument is
frequently based upon a wholesale denun
ciation of the 'profit motive'. Now, few
will doubt that our economic life is far
' Harry F. Ward, Our Economic Morality, pp.
146ff.
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from an adequate expression of the ethic
of the Gospel, and that the profit motive
is capable of abuses. What is debatable is,
whether private capitalism is per se anti-
christian while collectivism is essentially
Christian. May it not be that our economic
life, along with many other phases, has
never been christianized? It is far from
assured that a change in the holder will
effect simpliciter an alteration in the ethics
of the system.
There have never been wanting persons
to contend that their system reflected Je
sus' ideals: the dialectical theologians have
seen the absurdity of this, and have rightly
protested the tendency to 'domesticate
Christ'. So far as the clear teaching of
the Gospels is concerned, Jesus set forth
no economic system, but only laid down
certain principles. He insisted that the
abundance of a man's life does not consist
in the things which he possesses. This
maxim, taken seriously, would certainly
have a profound effect upon the business
practices of men.
It seems to this writer that more atten
tion is due to certain of our Lord's teach
ings than has been given them, notably
the parables dealing with stewardship. The
Parable of the Talents, for instance, seems
to imply nothing if not that there are dif
ferences in endowments, and that diligence
is demanded and rewarded. Probably some
will argue that we unduly restrict the sig
nificance of this parable to apply it to mat
ters of an economic nature. Yet in its
most direct sense it deals with endowments
and returns, and reveals attitudes toward
such matters. The judgment of the writer
is, that if we seek a justification for the
abolition of the profit motive in the New
Testament, we must ground it elsewhere
than in this parable. Those who take seri
ously the words of our Lord in this matter
will hardly accept at face value the cate
gorical denunciations of the profit motive
which have become conventional to liberal
social anthropologists. To question some
of the applications of the profit principle
is certainly legitimate. To treat it as social
enemy number one is, however, naive.
Othodox social ethics has for its central
assertion the claim that the state must be
strong, and that the political power must
take precedence over the economic order.'
In other words, the ultimate authority must
be political in character. Subordinate con
centrations of power can be permitted only
if they be "ethical"�that is, if they be
cultural or fraternal, but not economic.
(This assumes, rather naively, that the
economic order is per se unethical or at
least non-ethical.) How the strong state
proposes to build in the mind of the people
at the grass-roots an idealism which such
a plan requires has not been explained.
More important still, of what value would
dispersed non-economic organizations be if
they were dependent for their bread and
butter upon the political power? Possibly
they would serve a useful purpose as
sounding-boards for the political order.
Against the doctrine of the so-called
strong state, we would urge the following
objections. First, we must reject the state
realism for which Plato is famous : the
view of the state as an entity which is
per se ethical. Against this we must affirm
our belief in the intrinsically dangerous
character of the state in which the political
order is independent of, and supreme over,
the economic order, and in which it is un
checked by strong, if disguised, forms of
counter-coercion. This is not a demand for
weak or inefficient government, but for a
government in which the political sover
eignty is held in check by the delicate bal
ance of the other forces in human life.
The state is thus viewed as a framework
within which the common life must be
lived. This does not minimize the task
of the state to secure the common good.
It does, however, vigorously oppose the
omni-responsible state, with its paternalistic
'cradle-to-grave' guarantees. The demand
for such a state represents the 'failure of
nerve' of democracy, and the willingness to
sacrifice liberty for security. We must re
member that a democratic society involves
hazards for the social units; we believe
that many of such hazards can be removed
only at the price of the loss of the basic
* Muelder, op. cit., p. 9.
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liberties which we cherish.
Against the charge that the fear of the
strong state grows out of misanthropy, we
urge that our insistence upon a state in
which the political power is counter-
checked by economic and social power-dis
persions is based upon a wholesome realism
with respect to human nature. At this
point, we affirm our belief that the political
left is operating upon an assumption of
the theological left which is naive�namely,
that of the fundamental goodness of man.
At this point liberals will do well to heed
the warning bell of the crisis theologians
as they insist that sin has penetrated the
very core of human nature�an insight
which is by no means new to historic Chris
tianity. Derived from this ingrained sin
fulness are the impulses of will-to-power
and will-to-acquire which survive the pious
counsels of liberal statecraft, and which
have historically left no middle ground be
tween the state of dispersed controls and
the totalitarian state.
It is difficult to avoid the observation,
also, that the tendency of the orthodox
school of social ethics to espouse the cause
of the poHtical left grows out of a 'band
wagon' mentality�a desire to ride the crest
of the wave. Possibly the latent reasoning
is as follows : the trend is toward the left,
therefore let us seek to harness the trend.
This may be good expediency: it is hardly
good Christianity. At this point let it be
said that we hold no form of political and
economic system to be essential to the
proclamation of the Christian message.
Christianity was born in an era of dictator
ship, and has survived the rise and fall of
tyrants. Our concern here is for the form
of statecraft which seems most compatible
with the Christian message.
Again, leftist social ethics has a blind
spot for the ability of the capitaHstic order
to correct its own economic abuses. One
gets the impression that its proponents are
living in the days of Ida M. Tarbell, while
capitalism has moved far ahead in human
izing itself. It is true that there is yet
much land to be possessed; there is no
reason that in a flexible democracy, such
abuses as can be eliminated should not be
progressively left behind. To say the least,
it scarcely makes sense to set for purposes
of comparison the worst features of capi
talism in practice against the paper ideal of
the socialist state.
Of the objections which we have raised
to the strong state proposed by orthodox
social ethics, the sum is this: such a state
as this demands such a subordination of all
other forms of power to the political power
that there is no stopping-place short of the
regimented state. The verdict of history is
that such statecraft tends to inbreed itself,
and to lead to tyranny. There is no historic
precedent for the so-called ethical state
demanded by the 'progressive' left. And
to blame the development of totalitarianism
upon the prior influence of the capitalistic
order, and to brand fear of the state as
misanthropy, is in our judgment to employ
weasel words.
Finally, we are among those who, while
deploring the lack of equity and efficiency
under current democracy, must affirm our
preference for free institutions, maintained
through the balance of private against pub
lic power�even though these freedoms be
secured at the price of some inefficiency
and duplication of effort. It is far from
certain that these abuses can be eliminated
in the leftist state. We believe, further,
that there is precedent which warrants the
belief that a democratic society, with pri
vate capitalism moderately regulated by
law, affords a framework within which
economic and social abuses can be pro
gressively eliminated. We believe that such
a society accords best with a realistic view
of human nature, and that it will in the
long run afford the best set of factors with
in which human freedom can be main-
�H. B. K.
